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A Fair on-line purchase

In this appendix, we describe a variation of our exchange protocol for making electronic payment. To be consistent with the literature on payment protocols, we will adjust our terminology. A customer C wishes to purchase a secret key K_V initially held by a vendor V, using an electronic payment protocol with an on-line authority A. We assume that all three parties know a one-way function f on the keyspace (of the form described in Section 3), and that initially C knows $f(K_V)$. At the end of the fair purchase, in addition to the security properties required for basic electronic payment, the following will be true:

1. If all three parties are honest, then C learns K_V, and V is credited for the purchase.
2. If C and A are honest, then V will not be credited for the purchase unless C learns K_V.
3. If V and A are honest, then C learns nothing useful about K_V unless V is credited for the purchase.
4. If C and V are honest, then A learns nothing useful about K_V.

Again, we henceforth assume that at most one of C, V, and A misbehaves, as the properties above require nothing otherwise.

Our protocol requires that C be able to generate an authenticator $\sigma_C(m)$ for a message m such that on-line authority A can authenticate m as having come from C without receiving it directly from C. If C possesses a private key and A knows the corresponding public key, then $\sigma_C(m)$ could be C's digital signature on m. If A and C share a PIN that is unique to the customer, and if C possesses a public key for A, then $\sigma_C(m)$ could be the encryption of PIN$||m$ under A's public key.

The protocol operates as follows:

1. C chooses a random y (in the domain of f) and sends

$$C \rightarrow V \quad : \quad y, f(y), f(K_V), \sigma_C(f(y)||f(K_V))$$

2. When V receives

$$y, \alpha, \beta, \gamma$$

it computes $x = K_V y^{-1}$ and sends

$$V \rightarrow A \quad : \quad x, \alpha, \beta, \gamma$$

3. A verifies that
   - $\beta = F(x, \alpha)$, and
   - α and β came from C (using γ)

   If so, A sends an acceptance message to V and will subsequently give x to C upon direct request, e.g., after C identifies itself to A using its private key or PIN. Otherwise, A sends a rejection message to V.
4. V notifies C of A's decision or if V timed out on A. If A accepted, then V sends K_V to C.
5. If C does not receive K_V (i.e., a value consistent with $f(K_V)$) from V, it requests the missing share x from A, from which it can reconstruct K_V.

This can be incorporated into many electronic payment protocols without increasing the number of flows among the participants, e.g., iKP and NetCash. When incorporated, A would verify the conditions for ordinary acceptance of a purchase, in addition to the test in Step 3 above.

We now argue that this protocol meets our goals. If V misbehaves, then this will lead to rejection by A unless x is indeed the missing share of the key that the customer wants. In this case, C can claim this missing share x from A. If C misbehaves, and the purchase is rejected, then it learns no relevant information about K_V from either V (who only responds with the standard rejection of the underlying purchase protocol) or A (who will not reveal x after rejection). If C misbehaves and the purchase is accepted, then C will only learn information that it has paid for. Lastly, if A misbehaves, it will never learn anything useful about K_V, as it never receives y.

- **certified mail:** fair exchange of a message and possibly a non-repudiation of origin token against a non-repudiation of receipt token,
- **contract signing:** fair exchange of signatures on a contract, and
- **payment with receipt:** fair exchange of a payment for a receipt.

For *certified mail*, most practically relevant protocols are of the same type as those in the ISO documents: they involve a third party even in the exception-less case [e.g., Ford 94, Grim 93, Herd1 95, Herd2 95, ZhGo 96]. In cryptologic protocols for certified mail [Blum 82, Gold 82, BaTy 94], the goal is to achieve fairness *without* a third party, which necessarily implies a probabilistic definition of fairness [EvYa 80]. It is achieved by the *gradual release of secrets* over many rounds: during each round, some knowledge about the message and/or the tokens are revealed. If either party stops before the protocol run is complete, both parties are left with comparable knowledge and, if one assumes comparable computational capabilities, both are able to computationally recover their respective expected items of information (message and/or non-repudiation tokens) to the same extent.

Contract signing without a third party can also be based on the same gradual release of secrets approach [EvGL 85]: the signatures on the contract are released gradually. Assuming that both parties have similar computational capabilities, both parties are able to reconstruct the signed contract to roughly the same extent at any time during a protocol run. Another approach is the *gradual increase of privileges* [BGMR 90] in which the probability that the contract will be deemed valid is increased gradually over several rounds until it is "1" in the last round. This removes the requirement that both parties have similar computational capabilities. A contract signing protocol which is similar to our instantiation of the generic protocol has been proposed by B. Pfitzmann in [Pfit 95].

Due to their gradual approach, cryptologic protocols for certified mail or contract signing are expensive with respect to communication and computation: the knowledge or privilege is increased gradually and the probability of success and the fairness is related to the number of messages exchanged between originator and recipient.

Practical protocols for payment with receipt are normally not described as separate protocols which are independent of the payment mechanism used but rather included as receipt mechanisms into specific payment systems [BGHH 95]. In [PWP 90], Pfitzmann et al. described a protocol for fair exchange of payment and receipt where the "bank" generates a receipt in case the payee refuses to do so. Bürk and Pfitzmann [BüPf 90] extended this to a protocol for payment for receipt where a third party is only involved in case of an exception. Our protocol can be considered as a generalisation of the protocol of [BüPf 90].

3. A Generic Protocol for Fair Exchange

3.1 Service Description for Fair Exchange

A two-party exchange exchanges electronic goods between two participants, O (for "originator) and R (for "recipient"). We consider three types of electronic goods: confidential data, money (payments), and signatures on public data. In order to start an exchange, each party X (one of O and R) has to input the following parameters:

1. $item_X$ the item X wants to send[1].
2. $descr_X$ a description of $item_X$, detailed enough to identify all important properties of the item to the person receiving it. For example, the description of contract can be the text of the contract.
3. $expect_X(descr_X, descr_Y)$ a predicate which formalises the expectation of a participant. It evaluates to *true* if the user X is satisfied when receiving an item described by $descr_Y$ in exchange for an item described by $descr_X$.
4. *fits*(*descr, item*) a predicate which evaluates to *true* if the description fits the item. This predicate cannot be evaluated automatically for some types of items. For example, a computer can check if the value transferred in a payment is a $20 whereas it is not practical to check if a picture depicts a sunrise. For those types of items whose descriptions cannot be checked automatically, the human user may be prompted whether he likes the item received. Alternatively, if the user discovers a mismatch after the protocol run is completed, he can be allowed to use the evidence generated during the protocol to raise a dispute at a human arbiter.

In Section 4.1, we list possible choices for *descr* and *fits*() for different types of items. The service outputs to each party X

1. $item_Y$ the item X has received from the other participant Y, and
2. $descr_Y$ a description of its promised properties.

The service also results in some *evidence*, including non-repudiation tokens. The user can retrieve the evidence from the system and use it to prove properties of the exchange to an arbiter. In case of a dispute, a dispute protocol is executed between one participant of the exchange in the role of the prover and any other (honest) player in the role of the arbiter: depending on the exchange protocol and the property to be proven, additional participants in the exchange may also be required to participate in the dispute in the role of witnesses. Input to the dispute protocol are the statement to be proven and the evidence output by the exchange protocol. Example statements that can be proved are:

- A given party sent a given item (Non-repudiation of origin)
- A given party received a given item (Non-repudiation of receipt)
- The complete exchange took place (Non-repudiation of the exchange)
- The parties agreed on what to exchange

3.2 Protocol Description

We propose the generic fair exchange protocol shown in Figure 1 to Figure 3. It exchanges different types of data with non-repudiation of origin and receipt. It is based on asymmetric cryptography, namely, an arbitrary digital signature scheme with the necessary certification infrastructure, a collision-free one-way function h(), and a commitment scheme consisting of a procedure *commit*() to commit to an item and *open*() to verify if an opened commitment fits an item. We require from the commitment that

- nobody can change its contents without invalidating it, and
- nobody can get any information about its contents unless the committer explicitly opens it.

1 The item may also be input at a later stage: for example, a certain party may decide to spend the effort of putting its item together only after the other party has committed to the exchange (or perhaps after actually receiving the item from the other party).

We assume that recipients of signatures or outputs of the one-way function check their validity even though we do not depict it in our figures. The protocol is not symmetrical. It guarantees only weak fairness for the originator if no item exchanged is revocable or generatable. Otherwise, and for the recipient, strong fairness is guaranteed.

Let O denote the originating party that initiates the protocol, T the third party that ensures fairness, and R the recipient of the initiation message. Each party, P, has a pair of public and secret key of a digital signature scheme. For a message m, $sign_P(m)$ denotes the digital signature of P computed on m. We assume that m and a return address (potentially anonymous) of the signer can be retrieved from $sign_P(m)$ in order to allow T to contact the signer. This can be achieved in any signature scheme by appending the anonymous address to the text to be signed.



Figure 1 Optimistic Protocol for Exchange with Non-repudiation of Origin and Receipt (NRO and NRR denote non-repudiation of origin and receipt, respectively. Thick arrows denote sub-protocols)

We use a synchronous timing model by assuming that there exist global rounds which include the time needed for transmission and processing of messages. We define an overall maximum time limit, *active-time t*, up to which a run of the protocol can remain active. The state of the run at the end of the active-time is final. We assume that only the connections between each party and T is reliable. In practice this can be implemented by a variety of ways:

- choosing a much higher time-out than for other connections, or
- falling back on comparatively more reliable media for communicating with T (e.g. from a connection over a packet-switched network, one can imagine falling back to a dial-up connection, and then to a dedicated line), or
- actually "visiting" a real arbiter such as a court.

This would result in three phases: first, the parties try to exchange the items without a third party, then they try a recovery with a third party, and finally, each computer outputs all evidence and any participant may visit a court.

Figure 1 depicts the generic exchange protocol. The basic idea of the protocol is that the originator O and the recipient R start by promising each other an exchange of items (two flows). If they do not agree on the exchange (e.g., the price of the goods) the protocol is aborted. Otherwise they proceed to exchange the items along with non-repudiation tokens (three flows). Sending certain items (e.g., a payment) may require a sub-protocol containing several messages. Potential involvement of sub-protocols is represented by the use of a thick grey arrow. If no exception occurs, the protocol only consists of these five flows and does not involve T. This is the case if O and R are willing to perform the exchange, and the network is functional[2]. If this is not the case, O, R, and T start an error-recovery phase. Recovery initiated by O is depicted in Figure 2. Recovery initiated by R is depicted in Figure 3. The initiator of the recovery phase will send T the messages of the initial agreement with the other party.

We now describe the protocol depicted in Figure 1 to Figure 3 in detail. To start the protocol, each party inputs the service parameters as described above. Message m_1 fixes *O's* view of the parameters. It contains the following items:

- which third party T is to be used in case of an exception,
- an address of the recipient R,
- two commitments to the random values y_O, and r_O in the form of images of the one-way function $h()$,
- the active-time limit t (see Section 3.3),
- the description $descr_O$ of the item, and
- a commitment com_O to the item computed using the *commit()* procedure of a cryptographic string commitment scheme, where possible.

The commitments to the random values are used to save signatures by committing to a value x with one signature and later releasing it to authenticate an additional message. Naturally, these authentications can also be replaced by signing the messages with any given signature mechanism. This enables the protocol to produce non-repudiation tokens in a given format signed with a given signature system. In the protocol, y_O can later be used to signal in a non-repudiable way that the third party T is to become involved, r_O for non-repudiation of receipt (NRR) to signal that O received $item_R$, respectively.

2 This includes the case that any lower-layer error-recovery of the network was successful.

The commitment com_O is used to provide non-repudiation of origin (NRO) for the item. If the item is "intangible" (e.g. a payment), it is not possible to construct a commitment to it. However, the sub-protocol used for sending such an intangible item may itself provide an NRO token, making it unnecessary to provide a separate one. If an NRO token is still necessary, one can leave the commitment empty, i.e., just fix the description and authenticate the non-repudiation of an item matching it by releasing key_O. Whenever the transfer of an item in a round (e.g. m_3) involves a sub-protocol, the additional information necessary for the NRO token is sent in an additional message.

If R does not agree with the exchange parameters after having received m_1 from O, it aborts. If it agrees, it sends m_2 containing a commitment to the item to be sent together with its description and some commitments to random values. With m_2, R acknowledges that it will send its item after having received m_3 containing the item it expects. Again, three pre-images are fixed for the same purposes as in m_1. If R sends m_2, both parties have agreed on the exchange and the protocol continues.

O sends its item, and opens the commitment by sending its key. R checks that the commitment contained this item and checks if the description fits. R then sends its item and pre-image for the NRR token together with its key to open the commitment. If O does not receive the message or if the item does not fit the commitment or its description, it starts its recovery procedure (Figure 2). Otherwise, it sends the pre-image for the NRR token. If this pre-image is not received by R, R starts its recovery procedure (Figure 3). If no fault occurred, both participants store their items and non-repudiation tokens and the protocol ends.

Recovery for O includes the following steps: in case O does not receive what it expects in m_4, it sends a message $\tilde{m}$ containing the initial agreement to T and authenticates the wish to involve T by revealing y_O. T checks the message and then provides a reliable channel between O and R via T through which O can replay m_3 to R as a first attempt (how to replay sub-protocols is examined in more detail in Section 3.7). R is then expected to reply with m_4. If the item in the replay of m_3 fits the description or the commitment and R nevertheless does not reply, T is convinced that R does not follow the protocol since we assumed that the network connection between T and R is reliable. It can therefore issue an *affidavit* m_T in the form of a signed statement certifying that all the messages and items fixed in $\tilde{m}$ were actually sent to R within the specified time (note that all messages in the protocol, including the affidavit, are implicitly tied to the timestamp t which is included in m_1). It is presumed that the affidavit can thereafter be used as evidence or to initiate revocation or replacement of an item. If R does reply with message m_4 to T, T can forward it to O. The protocol can then continue or R can ask T for message m_5 constituting the NRR token for R together with the messages of the initial agreement.

In case R does not receive m_5 after having sent m_4, it can engage in a similar recovery. Due to the asymmetry inherent in the protocol, T can in fact provide R with a strong fairness guarantee: R never sends the item it promised unless it has already received the item promised to it; Also, T can generate a replacement for a NRR token on behalf of O if O did not respond during recovery for R.

It is useful to identify when a protocol run is considered "completed." From the point of view of a party P, if a run of the protocol outputs the expected items (and non-repudiation tokens), then the protocol run is considered completed for P. The items already output to an honest party at the completion of a protocol run will not be invalidated. If the other party Q initiates a recovery afterwards, then the messages P has to send

during this recovery is not part of the earlier protocol run anymore (it is either just a replay of some message flows from the earlier run or proving properties of it). At the end of active-time limit, the protocol is definitely completed for all parties.



Figure 2 Recovery for O



Figure 3 Recovery for R

3.3 Time-Outs

The only critical time-out of the generic protocol in Section 3 we have mentioned so far is the *active-time* limit t specifying the absolute time at T when the protocol ends. This time-limit ensures a consistent view of all honest participants. The state at time t is not changed afterwards: after this time everybody (and R in particular) will be sure that the status of an exchange is definitely final and will not be changed anymore. We express t in terms of the local clock at T since T is the only entity that makes decisions based on the active-time limit in a way that has an impact on the correctness of the protocol from the point of view of *other* entities: if T will not accept recovery requests after a certain time t', i.e., if T decides that a recovery request came too late, no fairness may be provided to the party requesting recovery. In practice however, both O and R have to know the time on T's clock in order to agree on the active-time limit as well as to compute local time-outs within rounds. Hence, we require a model in which clocks of all parties are synchronised (i.e., all parties have real-time clocks, and the differences between all local clocks of honest parties are limited by a constant).

To allow the parties to determine a reasonable active time, each party in the role of T will announce an estimated turn-around time t_T within which it will process exception requests from other parties.. T will also have a policy p_T, expressed as a function of t (variable, chosen by the parties of an exchange) and t_T (constant, chosen by T) which indicates the time after which T will not accept exception-handling requests from O or R. For example, p_T may be $t\text{-}2t_T$. All pending exceptions must be processed by time t.

In addition to these, each party has to decide on local time-outs after sending out *critical messages*. A critical message is one such that if it is sent, an appropriate response must be obtained or, if such a response does not arrive, some alternate action must be taken instead of simply abandoning the protocol run. In the case of O, m_3 is a critical message. In the case of R, m_4 is critical. In the case of T, the retransmission of the messages sent by O or R to each other via T are critical messages.

When O sends out m_3, it will start a local timer to determine when it should invoke T by sending $\tilde{m}$. The value τ_O of this time-out should be computed based on several factors: the overall active-time limit that was agreed upon earlier, the time that has passed since the protocol run has begun, and possibly expected network latency and processing delay at R's end. The exact computation can be at best based on some rules of thumb. R has a similar time-out τ_R. For example, if O sends out the critical message m_3 at time instant t', and it estimates that the expected communication delay between it and T to be t_{OT}, then the estimate for τ_O will be $p_T(t,t_T)- t_{OT}$. If O prefers to use a safety factor s in its estimate, τ_O becomes $t' + (1\text{-}s)(p_T(t,t_T)- t_{OT} - t')$.

Similarly, T has to decide on a time-out τ_T value for the period starting from the instant m_3 was replayed via T to R to the instant when T decides to issue an affidavit.

In general, every protocol step that is based on whether a response was received or not (the [time-out] conditions in the protocol pictures), a specific time-out value needs to be computed.

3.4 Requirements

We now give the requirements for the originator O. The requirements for the recipient R can be obtained by exchanging O and R. For each requirement, we first list the set of parties which are assumed to be honest and are expected behave correctly (a party is considered to misbehave if it does not respond to a critical message that is valid):

I. *Unforgeability of Non-repudiation Tokens*
- A. If O and T are honest, nobody other than O can create a valid non-repudiation token of O.

II. *The Role of the Third Party.*
- A. If T and O are honest, T does not create affidavits in the name of O.
- B. If T and O are honest, T creates affidavits in the name of R, if R does not behave correctly.

III. *No Unconditional Trust in the Third Party*
- A. If O is honest, no non-repudiation token or affidavit can be produced by T without O's part of the initial agreement.

IV. *Meaning of Non-repudiation Tokens*
- A. If an arbiter A, T, and O are honest and a non-repudiation of origin or receipt token for an item is output to O, then O can convince A that R sent or received the item, respectively.
- B. If an arbiter A is honest and no non-repudiation of origin (or receipt) token for an item is output to R, then R cannot convince A that O sent (or received) the item

V. *Weak Fairness of Exchange*
- A. If T and O are honest and if O does not receive *everything* necessary to satisfy its expectations, namely
  - NR tokens,
  - the committed item or an affidavit from T

  then R does not get *any* of
  - any additional knowledge about the item sent by O except its description,
  - or a NR-token,
  - or an affidavit.

VI. *Strong Fairness of Exchange*
- A. Strong fairness is the same as weak fairness except that an affidavit does not satisfy the expectations.

In Section 3.5, we will argue in an informal manner that our protocol meets the requirements of weak fairness for O and strong fairness for R. If the item promised by O is revocable or that promised by R is generatable by T, strong fairness can be achieved for both participants.

3.5 Security

Now, we describe informally why our protocol meets the requirements listed in the previous section.

Unforgeability of non-repudiation tokens follows from the assumptions that:
- The signature scheme is secure (this implies security of certification, too), and
- the item cannot be changed without invalidating the commitments.

The first two requirements on *the role of the third party* (T) state that T will not create affidavits and replacement items in the name of a correctly behaving party but *can* do so in the name of an incorrectly behaving party. When T is invoked it first checks to see if the party invoking T did in fact send out a critical, valid message. For example, if O invokes T, T first checks to see if the commitment messages (m_1 and m_2) are in order, linked by the inclusion of $h(m_1)$ into m_2, and that the complaint is about a critical message of O, namely m_3. If m_2 is valid, then only R could have created it given our assumptions about the security of the digital signature scheme. Therefore, if T decides to replay m_3 to R, then R must have committed to the protocol. Since the channel between R and T is assumed to be reliable, R is guaranteed to receive T's replaying of m_3. Thus, once R receives the message containing the valid item, all of its expectations must have been met. If R is behaving correctly, it can reply with m_4. and T will not send an affidavit (or a replacement item) in the name of R. T generates replacements only if it receives no response from R; but since we assumed reliable communication this happens only when R is misbehaving.

If R invokes T, T can check that m_1 and m_2 are in order and relay m_4 to O. At this point, all of O's expectations must have been met. Therefore, if O does not release r_O to complete the NRR token, T can issue a replacement NRR token to R since it is clear that O does not behave correctly.

No unconditional trust in the third party T is required since both messages m_1 and m_2 containing the name of T must be included in any valid non-repudiation token or affidavit issued by T, i.e., if the party never successfully participated in an initial agreement, no valid token or affidavit can be produced by any party.

The intended *meaning of the non-repudiation tokens* follows from the facts that:
- non-repudiation tokens are unforgeable,

	conf. data	public data	payment
item	*data*	*data*	payment of *amount* to *payee*
descr	*text*	*data*	*amount, payee*
expect() checks:	*text*	*data*	*amount, payee*
fits()	*may ask user*	*descr=item?*	*query the payment system used.*

Table 1 Different Types of Items

- a replacement token issued by T on behalf of O or R is equivalent to a token issued by O or R respectively, and
- a judge will use the same "test" for the validity of non-repudiation tokens that a recipient of the token applies during the course of the protocol.

Weak fairness of exchange for O follows from the fact that if O does not receive everything it expects, then either O did not send out m_3 (in which case only the description of the item has been revealed to R) or if message m_3 was sent without receiving the expected item and the NR-tokens, then T issues an affidavit. In both cases, O's requirements are met.

On the other hand, assume that R received an affidavit instead, T was required to replay all expected items to O through the reliable channel provided by T before issuing the affidavit. This is a contradiction to our assumption that T is honest and O did not receive everything it expected.

Strong fairness of the exchange for R follows from the facts that:

- R never releases the item it promised unless it has received the item it wants along with the NRO token for it, and
- if O fails to release the pre-image necessary to complete its NRR token (r_o), T will provide a replacement token to R according to the requirements on the role of T.

3.6 Weak vs. Strong Fairness

During the analysis of the protocol, we stated that weak fairness is provided to O, whereas strong fairness is always provided to R. However, strong fairness can be provided to both parties, if at least one item can be revoked or if T can replace it without cooperation of its sender, i.e., the affidavit issued by T can be used to

- *revoke* or *cancel* the item already sent by O if it is *revocable.*
- *generate* a replacement for the item promised by R if it is *generatable.*

If only one of the items has one of these properties this asymmetry can be taken into account in deciding which party in the fair exchange plays the role of the originator O: if the participant sending a revocable item acts as the originator or if the participant sending a generatable item acts as recipient, strong fairness is guaranteed by our protocol. If both items are neither generatable nor revocable, we can only guarantee weak fairness and one may therefore rather use an exchange protocol with an on-line third party.

Revocability can be achieved in cooperation with the bank for most payment systems: for example, using a credit card payment system with cancellation or using two-showable coins [BüPf 90, PWP 90, Jako1 95]. It is not practical if the non-repudiation tokens have a meaning outside the protocol (e.g., so called "public data." See Section 4). Both participants would be required to participate in an arbitration, since an issued token may have been revoked. Generatability or revocability can be added to confidential data by depositing the data at a third party which automatically releases it after the active time of the protocol. By showing an affidavit, this release can be prevented. Similarly, to add generatability, this party will only release the data if a proper affidavit is shown to it.

3.7 Transfers Involving Sub–Protocols

Sending certain items such as payments may involve sub-protocols. When T is invoked after an exchange T must be convinced that the receiver really got the item before issuing affidavits. In order to convince T there are several possibilities:

- the item can be sent to T who checks it and sends a similar item to the receiver,
- the protocol can be re-run while all messages are sent via T, or
- the protocol may have the following properties:
  - they are atomic: in case of interruptions they either recover to complete the protocol run or roll back to the state before starting it, and
  - they have the ability to produce evidence that proves that a protocol run did in fact complete.

  We call such protocols *well-defined.* If a sub-protocol is well-defined, then a party using it in an exchange will need to invoke T only when it has proof of protocol run completion that can be shown to T. To handle the exception, T makes sure that the proof is valid, show it to the other party. If the other party does not oblige, T issues an affidavit. In other words, there is no need to replay the protocol run.

Note, that any protocol where T can check if the item was transferred given the transcript of all messages can be extended to a well-defined protocol by sending critical protocol messages with non-repudiation. However, this will not be possible for arbitrary protocols without extending them. Counterexamples include protocols where messages are encrypted with the recipient's public key and the corresponding private key is not known to T.

The problem of enabling T to verify sub-protocol is not specific to optimistic exchanges: during an on-line-exchange T also needs to be able to check what has been transferred. However, the requirements on the sub-protocol for the optimistic approach are slightly stronger than for an on-line arbitration since it requires two "tries" for transferring the item: after trying to send an item directly, on-line arbitration must still be possible to enable recovery by T.

	public data	conf. data	payment
public data	contract signing	certified mail	payment with receipt
conf. data		exchange of goods	fair purchase
payment			currency exchange

Table 2 Examples of Exchanges

4. Exchangeable Items

We now describe the items which can be "plugged" into the generic protocol and the resulting exchanges.

4.1 Types of Items

In the generic fair exchange protocol described in Section 3, we used *item* and *descr* to represent the real data to be exchanged. We now describe different data types to be exchanged; namely public data, confidential data, and payments:

- *confidential data:* some data which will be released during the protocol described by an optional text, examples include digital goods and messages,
- *public data:* data which may be released even if the protocol execution has not been successful, for example information which has already been known to both communication partners, like contracts, and
- *payments:* a payment protocol is executed to transfer a value from payer to payee.

Each type has specific descriptions. A summary is given in Table 1. Note, that in all cases a participant receives non-repudiation tokens.

Confidential data is some data which must not be released without receiving the item to be exchanged for it. It may be valuable data, such as computer software or just certified mail. If the recipient of confidential data has certain expectations, such as for images or programs, the protocol must check if these expectations are met. Since the data itself cannot be checked, one needs additional information to verify this agreement on the exchange. Therefore the initial agreement fixes a description to enable the recipient to check if it agrees on the description of the item to be received. However, the sender may still send data which does not fit its description. As countermeasures, the *fits*() predicate may be evaluated interactively. In any case the parties may later dispute non-electronically if the data fits the description at a human arbiter.

To illustrate the distinction between description and data, we consider a fair purchase of computer software. The buyer would like to buy a text processor. The buyer inputs a description like "Name, Version, Year, Word Processor for OS/2, Number of kB, provides at least the following features: ..." which he has received in the offer from the seller. During the fair purchase the protocol compares this text input by the buyer with the text signed by the seller together with the commitment on the program data. If the descriptive texts are not equal, the buyer aborts. Later, the buyer checks the program and if the program does not execute under OS/2, he may invoke an arbiter which may decide on the dispute.

Public data is some data where the only purpose of the protocol is the fair exchange of non-repudiation tokens for it. The data itself is either known to both parties or may be released even in the presence of faults. Examples are contracts, the text of receipts or binding descriptions of confidential data. Note that even if the exchanged public data is empty (e.g., in exchange for confidential data during certified mail), a time-stamp and non-repudiation tokens are generated nevertheless.

A payment is the transfer of value from one party to the other. Depending on the type of payment system used, payments are revocable, i.e., during a certain time, the third party is able to cancel the payment, or generatable, i.e., the bank may enforce a bank transfer given the amount and the accounts of payer and payee.

4.2 Exchanges

The resulting exchanges are listed in Table 2. The efficiency improvements are mainly based on the omission of obsolete messages depending on the minimal service needed. The data types described above can be plugged into the generic exchange protocol. Some optimised protocols for the resulting possible exchanges are identified in Section 5. The timestamp t is directly or indirectly included in all messages of the protocol. Therefore, using a timestamp in an exchange is effectively the same as using an empty item.

5. Optimised Protocols for Fair Exchanges

We now give optimised protocols for specific instantiations of the generic protocol.

5.1 Certified Mail

This is the problem of sending an electronic mail and being able to prove the receipt of the mail to third parties afterwards. This is one of the services provided by existing non-repudiation standards [ISO1, ISO2, ISO3].

5.2 Fair Purchase

Fair purchase is the problem of a fair exchange of payment for on-line delivery of goods such as the result of a database query or a program. In the protocol, the first two messages define the goods and price. The third message is the payment from O to R. The fourth message is the delivery of the goods. If the goods are not delivered in time, O would resend the payment via T which would ask R to resend the goods. If R does not do so within some time, T will issue an affidavit which can be used to undo the payment.

6. Acknowledgements

We thank Birgit Baum-Waidner, Birgit Pfitzmann, and Michael Steiner for valuable comments and discussions. This work was partially supported by the European Commission and the Swiss Federal Department for Education and Science in the context of the ACTS Project AC026, *SEMPER*; however, it represents the view of the authors only. *SEMPER* is part of the *Advanced Communication Technologies and Services* (ACTS) research program established by the *European Commission Directorate General XIII*. For more information on *SEMPER*, see *http://www.semper.org/*.



Figure 4 An Optimistic Protocol for Fair Purchase based on Payments on Hold.



Figure 5 An Optimistic Protocol Certified Mail with Non–repudiation of Origin and Receipt.

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